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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 12-2466 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
BRIAN K. DAGOSTINO, II, 
 
Appellant 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 3-09-cr-00042-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 8, 2013 
 
Before:  RENDELL, AMBRO, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 10, 2013)                               
 
________________ 
 
OPINION 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
Brian K. Dagostino, II appeals the sentence and restitution order imposed by the 
District Court following his guilty plea to receipt of material depicting the sexual 
exploitation of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), and possession of material 
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depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).  
We affirm the sentence, but vacate the restitution order. 
 Prior to sentencing, the U.S. Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation 
Report (“PSR”) stating that a victim was seeking restitution under the Mandatory 
Restitution for Sex Crimes section of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 18 
U.S.C. § 2259(a).  The PSR did not calculate the financial effect of Dagostino’s offense.  
The PSR explained that the precise amount of the victim’s harm could not be determined 
accurately at the time the report was submitted to the Court, and advised that the 
Government was “in the process of compiling additional information as to this issue.”  
PSR at 15. 
The District Court sentenced Dagostino to concurrent terms of 100 months’ 
imprisonment followed by 15-year terms of supervised release.  In addition, it ordered 
restitution in the amount of $5,000.  It arrived at this amount after reading an Updated 
Victim Impact Statement, prepared by the victim (referred to as “Vicky”), which the 
Government submitted at sentencing.  The victim’s statement is part of the record on 
appeal, and has been filed under seal.  However, it contained no financial estimates of the 
harm suffered.  See App. at 130–31. 
Dagostino raises two issues on appeal.1
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
  First, he argues that his sentence of 100 
months’ imprisonment was unreasonable.  Second, he argues that the restitution order 
was improper because neither the victim nor the Government submitted a specific amount 
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claimed for restitution, and the District Court failed to explain how it arrived at the 
$5,000 amount. 
 We review sentences for both procedural and substantive reasonableness, applying 
an abuse of discretion standard.  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); United 
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  The party challenging the 
sentence bears the burden of demonstrating unreasonableness.  Id. at 567. 
In this case, the District Court properly calculated the Sentencing Guidelines 
range, and considered each § 3553(a) factor, following the required procedure.  Gall, 552 
U.S. at 51.  It then applied a 51-month downward variance in light of Dagostino’s 
personal characteristics and lack of criminal history.  We have no reason to believe the 
sentence is unreasonable. 
We exercise plenary review over whether an award of restitution is permitted, but 
we review specific awards of restitution for abuse of discretion.  United States v. 
Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 125 (3d Cir. 1999).  The Mandatory Restitution for Sexual 
Exploitation of Children Act provides that restitution in “the full amount of the victim’s 
losses” is “mandatory.”  18 U.S.C. §§ 2259(b)(1), (4)(A). 
The Government must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the amount of 
loss sustained by the victim.  18 U.S.C. § 3664(e).  A court “must point to the evidence in 
the record supporting the calculation of loss to the victim[],” based on “specific findings 
regarding the factual issues.”  United States v. Graham, 72 F.3d 352, 356–57 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
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The parties do not dispute the District Court’s determination that Vicky was a 
victim of Dagostino’s offense.  We also conclude that the District Court properly found 
that Dagostino was the proximate cause of the victim’s loss.  At sentencing, the 
Government submitted an impact statement from the victim that describes the daily 
anxiety and paranoia that Vicky experiences, knowing that people are taking pleasure in 
the sexually explicit images of her abuse.  We have consistently held that receiving and 
possessing child pornography causes direct harm to the victims depicted.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 259 (3d Cir. 2007) (explaining that 
“[c]onsumers . . . who . . . receive or possess child pornography directly contribute to this 
continuing victimization”). 
However, the parties agree that the Government did not present evidence of 
specific loss.  It is not possible to discern how the District Court arrived at the $5,000 
amount or to “point to evidence in the record supporting the calculation of loss.”  
Graham, 72 F.3d at 357. 
 The Government asks us to remand for it to present such evidence.  We decline to 
do so.  Although we may reopen the record where the prosecution did not “have a fair 
opportunity to fully counter defendant’s evidence,” this is not such a case.  United States 
v. Dickler, 64 F.3d 818, 832 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Graham, 72 F.3d at 355–56.  The 
Government had a fair opportunity to submit evidence of the victim’s loss, and to allow 
the Government to submit new evidence on remand would grant it “a second bite at the 
apple.”  Dickler, 64 F.3d at 832. 
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We recognize that Congress intended § 2259 to provide “broad restitution for a 
minor victim.”  Crandon, 173 F.3d at 126.  However, the law is equally clear that 
restitution must be supported by a calculation of the victim’s loss.  Graham, 72 F.3d at 
356.  The Government submitted only one victim impact statement.  The statement 
contained a devastating portrayal of an adult haunted by grotesque and unjustifiable 
wrongs done to her as a child.  We do not diminish the toll this has taken on Vicky.  We 
share the District Court’s understandable and, in fact, quite natural inclination to provide 
some compensation for the harm sustained by her.  Unfortunately, however, the 
Government’s failure to submit timely some evidence by which to measure Vicky’s 
financial loss precludes us from affirming the District Court’s modest restitution order.  
As such, our precedent requires us to vacate without remand the $5,000 restitution award. 
 In this context, we affirm Dagostino’s sentence and vacate the restitution order. 
 
